Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction and the Special Relationship Requirement in the Criminal Acts of Third Persons—State v. Back by Bender, Brian D.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 5
2010
Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/
Nonfeasance Distinction and the Special
Relationship Requirement in the Criminal Acts of
Third Persons—State v. Back
Brian D. Bender
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Bender, Brian D. (2010) "Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction and the Special Relationship Requirement





TORTS: THE FAILINGS OF THE 
MISFEASANCE/NONFEASANCE DISTINCTION AND THE 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT IN THE 
CRIMINAL ACTS OF THIRD PERSONS—STATE V. BACK  
Brian D. Bender†  
 I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 391 
 II. HISTORY ................................................................................. 393 
A. The Origins of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction 
and Its Use in the Duty Analysis ...................................... 393 
B. Minnesota’s Move to a General Duty of Reasonable Care 
and Its Influence on Recognizing a Duty for the Harms 
Caused by the Criminal Acts of Others .............................. 400 
C. The Special Circumstances Doctrine in Minnesota and 
Abroad ......................................................................... 403 
 III. THE BACK DECISION .............................................................. 407 
A. The Facts ...................................................................... 407 
B. The Lower Courts’ Holdings ............................................ 409 
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Back ............................. 410 
 IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BACK DECISION .......................................... 411 
A. The Back Decision in View of the 
Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction ............................. 4112 
B. The Back Decision and the Court’s View of the Special 
Relationship Requirement ............................................... 126 
 V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 419 
 
       †       J.D. Candidate 2012, William Mitchell College of Law; M.S., Computer 
Science, University of Minnesota, July 2002; B.A., Computer Science, University of 
Pennsylvania, May 1999.  The author would like to dedicate this article to my late 
wife Meredith.  While you were unable to finish the journey with me, your 
unyielding faith in me gave me the courage to embark on an amazing adventure. 
 And to my daughter Samantha whose smile keeps me going.  The author would 
like to thank the William Mitchell Law Review staff and Profs. Michael K. 
Steenson, Mary Patricia Byrn, and Ted Sampsell-Jones for their effort and 
dedication.  The author would also like to recognize his friends and family, and in 
particular Leah, whose love and support has made navigating the complexities of 
being a law student as a widower with a young child possible. 
1
Bender: Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction an
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
  
2010] STATE V. BACK 391 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is in a word?  Judges and attorneys are taught that the 
English language—full of subtleties and layers—can be wielded 
deftly and with the surgical precision necessary to navigate 
complicated legal concepts.  Yet, some legal concepts are so 
haphazardly constructed that their usage creates a bludgeoning 
effect akin to pounding a square peg into a round hole.1 
One such concept is the difference between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance.2  Misfeasance has been defined as “an act which a 
reasonably prudent person would not do, or failing to do 
something which a reasonably prudent person would do.”3  
Nonfeasance has been defined as “not performing voluntary 
tasks . . . where there is no duty to act.”4  While demarcating the 
line between misfeasance and nonfeasance may appear merely as 
an academic consideration, the distinction carries real legal 
consequences in the application of our negligence law.5   
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is 
particularly important in negligence law because the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction has weighty implications as it 
relates to the duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third 
persons.6  If the defendant’s act is characterized as misfeasance, a 
 
 1. For rationale as to why the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is not 
well-suited for duty determinations, see infra notes 2, 12. 
 2. See generally John M. Adler, Relying Upon The Reasonableness of Strangers: 
Some Observations About The Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or 
Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867 (1991) (suggesting that the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is antithetical to the aims of the tort system.  
“The more fundamental problem with the no-duty-to-rescue framework, however, 
is substantive.  All of the exceptions to the rule are made necessary by a distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance that is itself fundamentally misguided.  In 
many situations, it is difficult to see how the distinction is more than semantic play.  
But even assuming that a difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance can be 
defined (or at least that a difference will continue to be recognized), that 
difference is given far too much significance within the traditional legal 
framework.  As a result, the rules and exceptions based on the distinction often 
fail to focus properly on any pronounced or imaginable aims of tort law.  Whether 
one views the goals of tort law to be the deterrence of unreasonably risky conduct, 
the compensation of victims through loss distribution, the imposition of values of 
fairness, or some combination of these goals, the focus of the common law rule 
based upon the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction will often undercut those 
aims.”  Id. at 877–78 (citations omitted)). 
 3. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Titus, 71 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 4. Lewis v. Razzberries, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
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duty generally attaches to prevent the harm caused by those 
actions.7  If the defendant’s act is characterized as nonfeasance, 
there is typically no duty to prevent the harm caused by the third 
person absent some special relationship.8 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently revisited this subject 
in State v. Back.9  In Back, the defendant asked her violent and 
jealous ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Super, for a ride to the house of 
another ex-boyfriend, Daniel Holliday, with whom she was trying to 
reconcile.10  Very soon after arriving, Back slapped a guest and 
threw at least one beer bottle down the stairs.11  Holliday then 
escorted Back outside where an argument ensued, during which 
Super shot and killed Holliday.12  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that as a matter of law, there was no duty on the part of Back 
vis-à-vis the altercation absent a special relationship,13 at least 
implying a nonfeasance character to Back’s actions.14  How would 
you characterize Back’s action of asking for a ride and inciting an 
altercation with full knowledge of the danger that Super 
represented: a) an actionable affirmative act giving rise to a duty to 
prevent foreseeable injury, or b) an inactionable omission absent a 
special relationship imposing a duty to protect?  
The decision in Back shows the difficulty in applying the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.  The difficulty in using the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction as a paradigm for 
adjudicating duty determinations15 should be a motivating factor in 
developing other standards by which we make duty determinations.  
One set of standards that attempts to mitigate the confusion 
inherent in the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is the 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. 775 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 2009). 
 10. Id. at 867. 
 11. Id. at 868. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 872.  The court explained that “[u]nder common law principles, 
there is generally no duty to protect strangers from the criminal actions of a third 
party.”  Id. at 870 (citing Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979)). 
 14. See infra Part IV.  The court never specially discusses misfeasance or 
nonfeasance in the decision. 
 15. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 878 (“Two fundamental problems plague 
the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance: (1) in many cases it is 
impossible to distinguish the two; and, (2) in cases where intuitively there is a clear 
distinction, that distinction does not always coincide with generally accepted 
notions about whether liability should attach.”). 
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Restatement (Third) of Torts.16  Adopting the concepts contained 
in the Restatement would go far in reducing potential confusion 
surrounding duty determinations.17  
This note will discuss the murky distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance, and how it affects the duty analysis 
in negligence law.  Part II of this note examines the history of the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,18 and duty analysis in light of 
this distinction.19  Part III presents the facts and discusses the 
supreme court’s holding in Back.20  Part IV analyzes the court’s 
decision in Back and its implications for the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction in the duty element of 
negligence.21  Finally, this note concludes that if Minnesota wants to 
free itself from the shackles of the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction, it should adopt a general duty of reasonable care.22 
II. HISTORY 
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance has 
played an important role in our application of negligence law even 
though the meaning of the words misfeasance and nonfeasance 
can be confusing at best.  To help understand the confusion that 
this distinction represents, this section will discuss the origins of the 
distinction, the duty element of negligence, and some of the 
approaches the courts have used to try and navigate situations 
where the misfeasance/nonfeasance determination is not clear-cut. 
A. The Origins of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction and Its Use 
in the Duty Analysis 
At early common law, there was no distinction between 
nonfeasance and misfeasance.23  Not until the 1800s did the 
 
 16. See infra note 88. 
 17. See infra note 87. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. For a thorough treatment of the origins of misfeasance and nonfeasance, 
see Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and Inaction in 
the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance From the Fifteenth 
Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 827 (1995) (“In sum, the 
record reveals that wherever they appeared in decisions between 1400 and 1800, 
the words nonfeasance and misfeasance lacked any true conceptual legitimacy.  
4
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distinction begin to crystallize, some say in error.24  In American 
jurisprudence, the maturation of this idea has been traditionally 
traced to Justice Cardozo.25  However, even at the time of Cardozo’s 
 
From the early fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries, the courts spoke of 
“inactionable nonfeasance” when they meant only to say that a defendant had no 
duty to perform a parole agreement.  They spoke of misfeasance when they meant 
only to say that, under some circumstances, one did have a duty to act toward 
others with a certain measure of care and prudence. Yet, in the mid-sixteenth 
century, as earlier noted, the common law determined that one did have a duty to 
honor a parole agreement.  Unwilling to part with the words to which they had 
grown attached, the courts then began to write of “inactionable nonfeasance” 
when they intended only to rule that one had no duty to honor a gratuitous 
promise.”). 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 826–27 (suggesting that the use of Watton v. Brinth, Y.B. 
Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9 (1400) in Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809) was 
an incorrect application of precedent, laying the groundwork for the holding that 
one is “responsible for a misfeasance, but not for a nonfeasance.” Id. at 97 (emphasis 
added)). 
 25. See, e.g., Rowe & Silver, supra note 23 at 836–39 (noting the difference in 
holdings in the landmark cases MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 
(N.Y. 1916) (holding that a duty of care applies to foreseeable others regardless of 
privity of contract) and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 
(N.Y. 1928) (holding that there was no liability because there was “mere negligent 
omission, unaccompanied by malice or other aggravating elements”)).  In Moch, 
Cardozo wrote:  
A time-honored formula often phrases the distinction as one between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance.  Incomplete the formula is, and so at times 
misleading.  Given a relation involving in its existence a duty of care 
irrespective of a contract, a tort may result as well from acts of omission 
as of commission in the fulfillment of the duty thus recognized by law.  
What we need to know is not so much the conduct to be avoided when 
the relation and its attendant duty are established as existing.  What we 
need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation.  It is here that 
the formula, however incomplete, has its value and significance.  If 
conduct has gone forward to such a stage that in action would commonly 
result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or 
actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a 
duty to go forward. 
159 N.E. at 898 (citations omitted).  Of this decision, Rowe & Silver note:  
Cardozo’s view as set forth in Moch governs decisions to the present day.  
It seems to provide that no omission is actionable unless first preceded by 
something fairly to be called positive action.  He asks whether ‘conduct’ 
has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly ‘produce 
harm.’  It is important that in Cardozo’s view, liability for omission rests 
on some underlying conduct through which the omission arose and does 
therefore depend at bottom on the distinction between action and 
inaction. 
Rowe & Silver, supra note 23 at 839 (citations omitted).  See also id. at 839–40 
(“Within the judicial arena, it seems that Cardozo more than others forged a 
concept of duty generally and in particular attempted to explain, adequately or 
not, the seeming paradox that (1) omission may generate actionable negligence 
5
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decisions, confusion regarding the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction was already apparent.  Cardozo himself characterized 
the formulation as “[i]ncomplete . . . and so at times misleading.”26  
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions—including Minnesota—have 
utilized the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.27  Still, courts 
 
but (2) that an individual is generally exculpated if his behavior were 
characterized as nonfeasance.” (citations omitted)). 
 26. Moch, 159 N.E. at 898 (citations omitted).  This incomplete formulation is 
further illustrated by a disconnect between scholarly work of that era and 
contemporaneous judicial decisions.  See generally Rowe & Silver, supra note 23 at 
841–44 (illustrating that the perspective of Professor Bohlen in Francis H. Bolen, 
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908) 
does not adequately explain decisions of the courts:  
[Bohlen] maintains, “nonfeasance” simply refers to that situation in 
which a defendant does no “positive” harm, and “misfeasance” to the 
situation in which by “interference” with the plaintiff, the defendant does 
“positive” harm . . . .  Bohlen’s perspective on misfeasance and 
nonfeasance seems palpably inadequate to explain the jurisprudential 
phenomenon at issue.  It fails to explain Thorne v. Deas, allegedly the first 
American case in which the matter arose.  The Thorne case involved a loss 
for which the plaintiff was uninsured.  The defendant had promised, 
without consideration, to procure insurance, but failed to keep his word.  
The report indicated that the plaintiff would have procured insurance on 
his own absent the defendant’s promise.  Therefore, the defendant did 
subject the plaintiff to a “positive” loss; the plaintiff’s position was 
genuinely worsened by the defendant’s inaction.  If the defendant had 
not made his promise, the plaintiff would have had his insurance and the 
loss would have been compensated.  Yet, the court ruled that the case 
involved only inactionable nonfeasance; Bohlen’s formulation does not 
explain the result. 
(citations omitted)).  See also Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative 
Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1272–73 (1949) (suggesting that Bohlen’s 
formulation does not work because most nonfeasance is a sort of pseudo-
nonfeasance). 
 27. See, e.g., Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) 
(holding the defendant liable for breaching his duty when he created a risk of 
harm to the plaintiff by turning him out into a blizzard: “The facts of this case 
bring it within the more comprehensive principle that whenever a person is placed 
in such a position with regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does not use 
due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that person, the duty at once 
arises to exercise care commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds 
himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid such danger; and a negligent 
failure to perform the duty renders him liable for the consequences of his 
neglect.”); see also Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999) (holding 
that homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff to take precautions to avoid 
aggravating an injury to a house guest); Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian 
Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792–93 (Minn. 1995) (holding that association 
owed no duty to prevent the suicide of a resident:  
Courts have traditionally shown reluctance to impose liability on others 
for self-inflicted harm. Certain special relationships, however, do create a 
legal duty to protect another from self-inflicted harm. That duty has most 
6
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have noted the difficulties present in these determinations, at one 
point noting that the distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance was “fanciful.”28  
Notwithstanding confusion surrounding its application, the 
use of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is deeply rooted in 
the jurisprudence of tort law.29  As a general proposition, courts 
recognize that one owes a duty “to avoid affirmatively causing 
physical harm to others.”30  In other words, courts will generally 
hold a person accountable for their misfeasance or “affirmative 
actions,” when such actions expose others to an unreasonable risk 
of harm.31  This accountability generally does not depend on 
whether that harm arises from an act—criminal or otherwise—of a 
third person.32 
 
often been found where an institution such as a hospital or jail has 
physical custody and control of the person to be protected. 
Id. at 792 (citations omitted)).   
 28. As early as 1910, the Minnesota Supreme Court held,  
[f]rom the facts stated in the complaint it satisfactorily appears that 
appellant undertook the execution of the duty of replacing the gauge, 
and that he performed it negligently; hence his act was one of 
misfeasance, and not one of nonfeasance.  This fact distinguishes the 
case from Drake v. Hagen, 108 Tenn. 265, 67 S.W. 470, and Van Antwerp 
v. Linton, 89 Hun, 417, 35 N.Y. Supp. 318. Strictly speaking, the act of the 
engineer in failing to put on the guard, was nonfeasance—that is, in not 
doing an act which he was required to perform; but the distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance is sometimes fanciful. 
Brower v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Minn. 385, 388, 124 N.W. 10, 11 (1910). 
 29. See generally Rowe & Silver, supra note 23. 
 30. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial 
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 751 (2005). 
 31. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) (“In 
general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise 
the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of 
harm to them arising out of the act.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B 
(1965) (“An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the 
conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even 
though such conduct is criminal.”); see also id., cmt. e (“There are, however, 
situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and 
guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of others.  In general, 
these situations arise where the actor is under a special responsibility toward the 
one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such 
intentional misconduct; or where the actor’s own affirmative act has created or 
exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such 
misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account.”  (emphasis 
added)).  
 32. Id.  See also McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54, 106–07 (D. 
Mass. 2006) (“The question of duty, on the present record, is much simpler, 
7
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Conversely, courts generally recognize that there is no duty to 
prevent harm caused by one’s nonfeasance—meaning there is no 
“duty to warn, protect, or rescue a person from risks created by 
another source.”33  This distinction reflects the maturation of tort 
law generally.34 
An excellent illustration of an application of both aspects of 
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction can be found in Touchette 
v. Ganal.35  In Touchette, defendant Mrs. Ganal and Mr. Touchette 
were involved in an extra-marital affair.36  As her relationship with 
her husband deteriorated, Ganal moved into her parents’ house.37  
Allegedly, during her time at her parent’s house, she taunted her 
husband by flaunting her affair with Touchette.38  This caused her 
husband to go on a violent rampage, killing Ganal’s parents, 
burning Touchette’s home to the ground, and causing the death of 
 
because it is to be determined not on the basis of what the relevant actor . . . failed 
to do, but on his commission of an act.  ‘Speaking in terms of classical tort 
principle, when one claims that negligence lies in the commission of an act, a 
defendant’s duty not to behave negligently typically extends to include all those 
whom the defendant might reasonably have foreseen to be potential victims of the 
negligence.’ . . . This duty does not depend on any special relationship between 
employees of the [defendant] and [the third party] or between employees of the 
[defendant] and [the plaintiff].  Indeed it does not depend on . . . any . . . 
person’s, status as [a defendant].  It is simply the duty that one person owes to 
another to act with care when he knows or should know that his action poses an 
unreasonable risk of harm to the other through the intentional conduct of a third 
person.” (quoting Carrier v. Riddell, Inc., 721 F.2d 867, 868 (1st Cir. 1983)) 
(emphasis in original)).  
 33. Cardi, supra note 30, at 751.  Said another way, “[t]he duties of one who 
merely omits to act are more restricted, and in general are confined to situations 
where there is a special relation between the actor and the other which gives rise 
to the duty.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965).  
In the early law one who injured another by a positive affirmative act was 
held liable without any great regard even for his fault.  But the courts 
were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior 
to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though 
another might suffer serious harm because of his omission to act.  Hence 
liability for non-feasance was slow to receive any recognition in the law.  
It appeared first in, and is still largely confined to, situations in which 
there was some special relation between the parties, on the basis of which 
the defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid or 
protection of the plaintiff. 
Id. 
 35. 922 P.2d 347 (Haw. 1996).   
 36. Id. at 348. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 349. 
8
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Touchette’s infant child.39 
In analyzing whether summary judgment was appropriate, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court in Touchette first determined—as a matter of 
law—if Ganal’s acts were to be characterized as nonfeasance, a 
marital relationship was not a special relationship that gave rise to a 
duty to protect persons from the acts of another.40  But the supreme 
court did not stop there.41  It went on to analyze the duty 
requirement with regard to whether the defendant’s acts should be 
considered misfeasance on the basis of whether her actions created 
an unreasonable risk of harm, and thus her actions created a duty 
under sections 302, 302A, and/or 302B of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.42  The court determined that Ganal’s actions did 
create an unreasonable risk of harm, and therefore, she owed 
Touchette a duty.43 
In Minnesota, the early cases seem to pay deference to both 
aspects of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,44 even when 
the cases before the court involved the criminal acts of others.45  
Minnesota has upheld a jury verdict that found a defendant liable 
for the damage caused by a thief who stole the defendant’s car,46 
and has remanded a case in which summary judgment was granted 
under similar circumstances.47  One argument for an imposition of 
duty was that this class of cases fell under a city ordinance, and 
 
 39. Id. at 348–49. 
 40. Id. at 352–55. 
 41. Id. at 355–57. 
 42. Id. at 357 (“Although the circuit court’s holding, as previously discussed, 
was correct regarding the question of [Ganal]’s duty to [Touchette] to 
affirmatively warn or to control [her husband] pursuant to sections 315 and 314A 
[requiring a special relationship], the circuit court failed to determine if [Ganal] 
owed a duty to [Touchette] pursuant to other authority, especially in view of 
appellant’s counsel’s many attempts to direct the circuit court’s attention to the 
potential viability of appellant’s claims against [Ganal] based on the breach of the 
duty set out in sections 302, 302A[,] and/or 302B.”). 
 43. Id. at 357–58. 
 44. See supra notes 27–28.  
 45. See Garceau v. Engel, 169 Minn. 62, 210 N.W. 608 (1926) (upholding 
ruling in favor of the plaintiff for the cost of goods stolen when the defendant 
negligently left the keys in the door and allowed a thief to gain access to the 
premises). 
 46. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 309 Minn. 
376, 245 N.W.2d 186 (1976) (reversing judgment notwithstanding verdict for the 
defendant after trial court rendered a jury verdict for the plaintiff). 
 47. See, e.g., Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. 
1978) (remanded to allow a jury to determine if the duty was breached). 
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there was negligence (or duty) per se.48  However, later rulings by 
the supreme court seem to have invalidated this position.49   
In Lundgren v. Fultz,50 the supreme court reversed a finding by 
the lower courts that no duty existed to protect against the criminal 
acts of others when a defendant psychiatrist allowed his patient to 
come into possession of some firearms.51  Lundgren is interesting 
because it seems to blur the distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance.  On the one hand, the supreme court set out to show 
that the defendant may have had a duty according to some special 
relationship.52  On the other hand, the supreme court indicated 
that foreseeability of the risk of harm, by itself, may give rise to a 
duty.53  In essence, the supreme court in Lundgren said that a 
reasonable jury may find a duty under either the special 
relationship requirement or foreseeability of the risk of harm 
arising out of the same set of facts.  That is, the supreme court 
seems to be implying that the defendant’s actions could reasonably 
be characterized as either nonfeasance or misfeasance, respectively. 
So, while it appears that Minnesota has strong inclinations 
towards nonfeasance determinations in applying the 
nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction,54 in limited situations, 
 
 48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950) 
(determining if the criminal act was an intervening cause because the duty issue 
was not appealed), overruled by Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 630; see also 
Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695 (1948) (determining if the 
criminal act was an intervening cause because the duty issue was not appealed), 
overruled by Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 630. 
 49. See, e.g., Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d at 638 (“Although the 
purpose of the ordinance may be to promote the safety of those using the public 
streets, we would be disregarding the clear language of the ordinance if we 
declared that its violation is negligence per se.  Nevertheless, the passage of the 
ordinance indicates that the governing body of the city of St. Paul recognizes the 
danger of leaving ignition keys in a parked, unlocked car.  That such danger exists 
and has been addressed by a legislative body may be considered by the jury in 
determining whether Ochsner should have foreseen that leaving the keys in the 
trunk created a risk to those using the public streets.). 
 50. 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984). 
 51. Id. at 26–27. 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“In law, we are not our brother’s keeper unless ‘a 
special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.’” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)). 
 53. Id. at 28 (“Justice Cardozo succinctly expressed the central relationship 
between the foreseeability of harm and the existence of a legal duty in Palsgraf, 
stating that ‘the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’” 
(quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 54. Almost to the point of ignoring the general proposition that “anyone who 
10
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Minnesota courts have found reason to blur the distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance.55  Minnesota courts have 
also found an existence of a duty to protect another from the harm 
resulting from criminal acts of third persons when misfeasance 
gives rise or otherwise creates an opportunity for the commission of 
the criminal act.56   
B. Minnesota’s Move to a General Duty of Reasonable Care and Its 
Influence on Recognizing a Duty for the Harms Caused by the 
Criminal Acts of Others 
Since at least the 1970s, an articulative adherence to both 
aspects of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction seems to have 
waned,57 causing an apparent atrophy in the application of 
misfeasance in Minnesota law.58  Such an approach is in opposition 
 
does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of a 
reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them 
arising out of the act.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965).  
 55. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 56. See supra notes 45–47. 
 57. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483–84 (Minn. 1979).  In 
Delgado, the court articulates that “[o]rdinarily there is no duty to control the 
conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing physical harm to another 
unless a special relationship exists.”  Id. at 483.  Such language is consistent with 
the nonfeasance aspect of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.  However, 
without specifically enumerating what constitutes the misfeasance aspect of the 
distinction, the court holds there is a duty because the defendants were engaged 
in an extremely dangerous activity, and thus, “created an unreasonable risk of 
harm.” Id. at 484.  This imposition of a duty is consistent with the misfeasance 
aspect of the distinction.  Because the court did not articulate the general 
misfeasance principle, future court decisions are seemingly untethered from it. 
 58. See, e.g., Sarau v. Oliver, No. C1-00-223, 2000 WL 1052143, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2000).  In Sarau, the court stated,  
[a]ppellant cites Restatement of Torts (Second) § 302 as support for the 
argument that respondent owed a duty to protect appellant from the 
actions of her son.  But this provision concerns only the character of a 
failure to act and does not address the existence of a duty.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 cmt. a (1965).  If there is no duty to 
act, a failure to act does not subject the actor to liability.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 302 cmt. a; 302B cmt a.  And there is no duty to act 
to protect another unless there is a special relationship that gives rise to 
such a duty.  Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 302 cmt a.   
Id. The court of appeals seems intently focused on the nonfeasance aspect of the 
distinction, apparently ignoring misfeasance in the determination of duty.  
Comment a to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302 states that “[i]n 
general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the 
care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to 
11
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with the march to a general duty of reasonable care,59 which 
Minnesota embarked on when it embraced a general duty of 
reasonable care in the context of entrants on land.60 
The transition to a general duty of reasonable care for tortious 
conduct has been slow to gain traction.  In 1968, California 
abolished the categorical approach to landowner duty in favor of a 
general duty of reasonable care to all entrants.61  In 1972, 
Minnesota joined other jurisdictions and moved closer to a general 
duty of reasonable care to entrants on land.62  Under the standard 
articulated in Roland there is a general duty of reasonable care for 
entrants on land regardless of whether the entrant is a business-
invitee, licensee, or trespasser.63  This notion of a general duty of 
reasonable care is in accord with the idea that we should be held 
accountable for the risk of harm that we create.64  
 
them arising out of the act.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, section 302 does seem to address the existence of a duty.  
In combination with section 302B, the Restatement seems to hold that such a duty 
is not extinguished just because the risk of harm is “through the conduct of the 
other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such 
conduct is criminal.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965).  This is 
further articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B comment e:  
There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is 
required to anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even 
criminal, misconduct of others.  In general, these situations arise where 
the actor is under a special responsibility toward the one who suffers the 
harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such intentional 
misconduct; or where the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the 
other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which 
a reasonable man would take into account. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 59. See Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s holding that the landowner owed no 
duty because landowners owe entrants a duty “to use reasonable care for the safety of 
all such persons invited upon the premises regardless of the status of the 
individuals.” (quoting Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 
647 (1972)(emphasis added)); see also Adler, supra note 2, at 902–04 (advocating 
Wisconsin’s approach to negligence, in which a duty exists for both nonfeasance 
and misfeasance). 
 60. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972) 
(abolishing the limited, categorical duties landowners owed to licensees and 
invitees in favor of a general duty of reasonable care to all invited entrants). 
 61. Roland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (“[T]o focus upon the 
status of the injured party . . . in order to determine the question whether the 
[defendant] has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and 
humanitarian values.”). 
 62. See Peterson, 199 N.W.2d at 647. 
 63. Roland, 443P.2d at 565–68. 
 64. Id. at 564 (“Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a 
12
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However, in Minnesota, other aspects of negligence law—such 
as the duty to protect others from the criminal acts of another—
have yet to fully embrace the notion of a general duty of reasonable 
care.65  In Minnesota, “[i]f the law is to impose a duty on A to protect 
B from C’s criminal acts, the law usually looks for a special 
relationship between A and B”66  This language has a strong 
correlation to the nonfeasance formulation presented by Cardozo.  
In particular, if there is no conduct,67 then a duty only attaches if 
“there exists a relation out of which arises a duty [to protect].”68   
Minnesota courts generally have found a special relationship 
to exist between common carriers with their passengers, inn-
keepers with their patrons, possessors of land that hold their 
 
position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think 
would at once recognise [sic] that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his 
own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury 
to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill 
to avoid such danger.” (quoting Heaven v. Pender (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509)). 
 65. As a general proposition, there is no duty to protect others from the 
criminal actions of a third party.   
Ordinarily, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person to 
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless a special 
relationship exists, either between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty to control, or between the actor and the other which gives 
the other the right of protection. 
Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979). 
 66. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989) (emphasis 
added).  The court in Erickson went on to say that such a relationship exists when 
“B has in some way entrusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that 
entrustment.” Id.  Compare Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007) 
(holding that a homeowner had a special relationship with a minor child she 
invited to live in her home, and therefore had a duty to protect the child from 
being sexually assaulted by another resident) with H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 
552 N.W.2d 705, 707–10 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a special relationship did not 
exist between a mobile park manager and the resident children and therefore no 
duty existed to protect the children from sexual abuse) and Pietila v. Congdon, 
362 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (holding that a special 
relationship did not exist between a homeowner and a person invited on the 
premises, and therefore the homeowner had no duty to protect the person from 
the criminal actions of a third person).  
 67. In other words, nonfeasance.   
 68. R.H. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965).  Comment c states:  
Hence liability for non-feasance was slow to receive any recognition in 
the law.  It appeared first in, and is still largely confined to, situations in 
which there was some special relation between the parties, on the basis of 
which the defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid or 
protection of the plaintiff.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
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premises open to the public with those who are lawfully on the 
premises, employers with their employees, schools with their 
students, and custodians with those for whom they are 
responsible.69  
The rationale articulated by the court for limiting a duty to 
protect against the criminal actions of third persons is that it would 
not be fair to hold one accountable for the criminal acts of 
another.70  In Pietila, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, 
[h]ow can one know what measures will protect against 
the thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the 
psychopath and the psychotic?  Must the owner prevent all 
crime?  Inasmuch as no police force has ever achieved 
that goal, the plaintiff cannot intend the imposition of an 
absolute obligation to prevent all crime.71   
Even with this articulated public policy limitation, Minnesota has 
found reasons to blur the bright-line rule that there is no duty to 
prevent the acts of third persons. 
C. The Special Circumstances Doctrine in Minnesota and Abroad 
One way in which Minnesota has softened this bright-line rule 
is through the adoption of the special circumstances doctrine, 
which allows a court to impose a duty if the criminal act is 
foreseeable or if the defendant’s preventative action is not overly 
burdensome.72  Minnesota adopted the special circumstances 
doctrine in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Grain Belt 
Breweries, Inc.73  Under the special circumstances doctrine, courts—
as a matter of law—can create exceptions to the no-duty to prevent 
 
 69. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 49 (Minn. 1996) (“[S]pecial 
relationships exist between parents and children, masters and servants, possessors 
of land and licensees, common carriers and their customers, or people who have 
custody of a person with dangerous propensities.” (quoting Delgado v. Lohmar, 
289 N.W.2d 479, 483–84 (Minn. 1979) (emphasis removed))).  These special 
relationships mirror the exceptions enumerated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 314A, 314B (1965).  
 70. Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 333. 
 71. Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (N.J. 
1962)). 
 72. Felty v. City of Lawton, 578 P.2d 757, 761 (Okla. 1977) 
 73. 309 Minn. 376, 380, 245 N.W.2d 186, 189 (1976) (“Special circumstances 
which impose a greater potentiality of foreseeable risk or more serious injury, or 
require a lesser burden of preventative action, may be deemed to impose an 
unreasonable risk on, and a legal duty to, third persons.” (quoting Hergenrether 
v. East, 393 P.2d 164, 166 (Cal. 1964))). 
14
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the acts of third persons rule when a special circumstance exists.74  
“[I]n some ‘special circumstances’, the negligen[t] acts of a third 
person are so foreseeable that such acts cannot properly be viewed 
as independent intervening causes.  Accordingly . . . under certain 
‘special circumstances’, a special duty to prevent the actions of a 
third person arises.”75   
The special circumstances doctrine is broader than the special 
relationship requirement in that a special circumstance is analyzed 
according to the foreseeability of an act and does not rely on 
traditional notions of a special relationship.76  It could also be 
argued that the special circumstances doctrine has more limited 
applications than the special relationship requirement because the 
analysis has typically been limited to the class of cases involving car 
theft in general, and key-in-ignition cases more specifically.77   
However, the courts have used language that would allow 
additional classes of cases to take advantage of the special 
circumstances doctrine.  For example, one court noted that,  
[m]any jurisdictions have held that under “special” or 
“unusual” circumstances, a duty may exist where a 
defendant should reasonably anticipate that its conduct 
will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to one in 
the position of the injured plaintiff.  If such danger is 
foreseeable, then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care 
 
 74. See Felty, 578 P.2d at 762 (concluding that the theft of a car with keys in 
the ignition and injury to another can be foreseeable in special circumstances, but 
affirming the defendant’s general demurrer because no special circumstances 
were pleaded); see also Hergenrether, 393 P.2d at 167–68 (holding that leaving a 
vehicle unlocked with the keys in the ignition was a special circumstance that 
created a duty to protect against the injuries caused when the vehicle was stolen 
and involved in a head-on automobile accident); Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Utah 1996) (finding upon interlocutory 
review that a duty not to leave keys in the ignition of unlocked cars at an auto 
dealership may have arisen upon special circumstances). 
 75. Felty, 578 P.2d at 761.   
 76. An act may also be analyzed according to the gravity of the harm or the 
burden of preventive action.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Minn. at 380, 
245 N.W.2d at 189 (describing how the facts of each case must be considered to 
determine whether the defendant had a duty).  Regardless, the special 
circumstances doctrine provides a broader scope of liability for defendants when 
the harm results from the criminal acts because there is no requisite showing of a 
special relationship needed to impose a duty. 
 77. See, e.g., Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. 
1978) (reaffirming State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 376 (holding that a 
special circumstance existed giving rise to duty when the defendant’s employees 
left their keys in the car and damage to the plaintiff’s insured was caused by a thief 
of said car)); see also supra note 74. 
15
Bender: Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction an
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
  
2010] STATE V. BACK 405 
for the safety of others.78 
When the weight of the foreseeability is great, it would seem that—
as a matter of public policy—these courts impose a duty to protect 
those at risk.79 
There are potential pitfalls with the special circumstances 
doctrine.  In particular, legal scholars have illustrated that folding 
the foreseeability determination into the duty analysis may have a 
harmful effect on the law.80  For example, if a court decides—as a 
matter of law—that a special circumstance exists, there is at least an 
implication that the court has also decided that there was sufficient 
foreseeability as a matter of law. Because foreseeability plays a role 
in determining the breach issue,81 the court has at least impliedly 
decided that issue as well.  When the court is making a duty 
determination based on foreseeability, they are in effect weighing 
the sufficiency of the evidence82 regarding the breach issue—a task 
 
 78. Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1255. 
 79. See id. (“Each case must be considered on its own facts to determine 
whether they result in a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons in the class of 
plaintiffs and thus create a duty to refrain from subjecting them to such risk.”); see 
also Hergenrether, 393 P.2d at 167 (“[E]ach case must be considered on its own facts 
to determine whether the joint effect of them in toto justifies the conclusion that 
the foreseeable risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and that the defendant . . . 
has a duty to third persons in the class of the plaintiffs to refrain from subjecting 
them to such risk.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 30.  W. Jonathan Cardi states:  
At the very least, foreseeability’s indeterminacy leads judges to treat like 
cases differently and different cases alike. . . . [Foreseeability] may be 
little more than a surrogate for unbound judicial discretion.  
Furthermore, to the extent that reference to foreseeability masks the 
actual reasons for a judge’s decision to impose or deny negligence 
liability, foreseeability obfuscates the judicial process and likely 
undermines its perceived legitimacy.   
Id. at 740–41; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of 
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998).  The article claims:  
The courts’ uncertainty about what to do with duty is displayed in their 
uneven use of the concept of foreseeability.  Sometimes foreseeability is 
deemed part of the issue of breach and thus left to the jury.  Other times 
it is deemed the essence of duty and kept for the courts.  Still other times 
it is left for the jury under the heading of proximate cause.  What one 
court finds unforeseeable as a matter of law, another court will find 
foreseeable as a matter of law.  Foreseeability is sometimes a necessary 
condition of liability, sometimes a sufficient condition, and sometimes 
merely a factor.  Far from cleaning up duty-analysis, the concept of 
foreseeability illustrates the confusion courts currently experience 
dealing with the duty element.   
Id. at 1776. 
 81. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 30, at 744–45 nn.17–24. 
 82. A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010) 
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which is generally regarded as being the providence of the jury.83 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has attempted to address 
this particular issue by presuming a duty if the actor’s conduct 
creates a risk of physical harm.84  Conversely, there is a no-duty 
presumption if the risk of harm is created by another source.85  
However, the Third Restatement’s approach is not without its 
critics.86  While it is beyond the scope of this note to weigh in on the 
merits of the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ approach, for the 
purposes of this note it is sufficient to recognize at least a potential 
 
(“While we purported to be discussing duty, we were in fact assuming the 
conclusion we claimed to be proving, and we were actually evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence . . . .”).   
 83. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 30.  The article states that:  
The second problem with foreseeability’s role in duty is that it operates as 
a vehicle by which judges decide questions traditionally reserved for the 
jury.  Specifically, by resolving duty based on an analysis of whether the 
risk created by a defendant’s conduct was foreseeable, judges are really 
deciding whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable—the essence 
of a jury’s determination of breach. 
Id. at 741.  
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARMS § 7 (2010).  Section 7(b) does give the courts the ability to make no-duty 
rules to support different policies.  But only “[i]n exception cases, when an 
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting 
liability.”  Id. § 7(b). 
 85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARMS § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 86. See Cardi, supra note 30, at 742 (discussing courts’ utilization of 
foreseeability to determine duty in negligence cases and the implications of recent 
installments to the Restatement (Third) of Torts on that process).  In a generally 
favorable treatment of the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
Cardi mentions that  
[o]ne might argue that it is not the place of a Restatement to effect such 
drastic reform in negligence law and in courts’ ability to administer that 
law. . . . The proper reach of a Restatement is a valid concern . . . 
however, the proposed Restatement will, if adopted by the courts, likely 
affect the substantive outcome of negligence cases only at the margins. 
Id.; John C. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place 
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 724 (2001) (finding that the drafted 
approach does not fairly and helpfully restate the law and advocating that 
negligence without duty is ill-conceived); see, e.g., Jane Stapleton, The Risk 
Architecture of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1309, 1332 
(2009) (“[T]he ‘risk architecture’ of the Restatement (Third) could have been 
presented with far greater clarity.  Key ‘risk’ notions have not been explicitly 
defined.  Terminology has not been deployed consistently.  Obfuscating synonyms 
have been used with no attempt made to explain their relation to other risk 
notions in the Restatement (Third).  All this threatens to undermine the user-
friendliness of the end product.”). 
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ideological shift to a presumed duty,87 a move away from the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,88 and internalize the possible 
benefits of that approach.89 
III. THE BACK DECISION 
A. The Facts 
Danna Back and Daniel Holliday “had been dating off and on 
for several years.”90  Their relationship initially deteriorated in 2003 
when Back and Holliday moved in together, and by the summer of 
2006, Back moved out.91 
During the summer of 2006, Back also dated Nicholas Super,92 
causing escalated tensions between Holliday and Super.93  Back 
knew of threats made by Super against Holliday and told police 
 
 87. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (illustrating that a presumed duty for the 
creation of risk would put the foreseeability question into the hands of the jury as 
a breach determination), and Cardi, supra note 30, at 739 (illustrating the benefits 
of removing foreseeability from the duty determination), with Goldberg, supra 
note 86, at 663 (suggesting that the confusion surrounding the concept of duty 
does not warrant a wholesale change to the negligence doctrine). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARMS § 37 cmt. c 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).   
Misfeasance and nonfeasance have a long history as concepts that explain 
the distinction between affirmatively creating risk and merely failing to 
prevent harm.  However, this distinction can be misleading.  The proper 
question is not whether an actor’s specific failure to exercise reasonable 
care is an error of commission or omission.  Instead, it is whether the 
actor’s entire conduct created a risk of physical harm.  For example, a 
failure to employ an automobile’s brakes or a failure to warn about a 
latent danger is not a case of nonfeasance governed by the rules in this 
Chapter, because in those cases the entirety of the actor’s conduct 
(driving an automobile or selling a product) created a risk of harm.  This 
is so even though the specific conduct alleged to be a breach of the duty 
of reasonable care was itself an omission. 
Id. 
 89. As it relates to foreseeability see, for example, Cardi, supra note 30, at 
767–804 (noting a shift in power from judge to jury and restraining erosions in the 
rule of law due to foreseeability’s malleability, e.g., the lack of transparency 
inherent in foreseeability-based determinations obscuring potential abuses of 
judicial power).  Similar arguments could be made regarding the malleability of 
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. 
 90. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 2009). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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that “Super threatened Holliday with a gun several times.”94  In one 
incident, Super “[drove] over to Holliday’s . . . and point[ed] his 
gun at [Holliday].”95  In another incident, Super fired shots at 
Holliday’s home while Back was there spending the night.96  Back 
stated that she “believed that Super fired those shots because he 
was jealous of Back being with Holliday,”97 and even noted on the 
night of the incident that “it was probably Nick trying to send a 
message because he knew that she was over there that night.”98 
In the early morning hours of January 1, 2007, Back called 
Holliday around 3:00 a.m., after being out with other friends to 
celebrate New Year’s Eve.99  She apparently intended to renew her 
relationship with Holliday, but was angered when she heard 
women’s voices in the background.100  Holliday asked Back to come 
over and Back called Super who agreed to drive her to Holliday’s 
house.101 
Back intended to start an altercation with Holliday and those 
at the party.102  In particular, Back intended “to go over there and 
fight the girls.”103  Once she arrived, Back slapped one of Holliday’s 
friends “because [she could],”104 then grabbed a beer bottle and 
threw it down the stairs.105  Shortly after her theatrics, Back and 
Holliday began to argue.106  After Back did not heed Holliday’s 






 94. Id.  “Back did not testify at trial, but the police conducted a videotaped 
interview with her after the shooting.  This interview was played for the jury during 
trial.” Id. at n.3. 
 95. Brief of Respondent, Back, 775 N.W.2d at 866, (No. A08-17), 2009 WL 
4917088 at *3 (citations to the trial transcript omitted). 
 96. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted).  
 97. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867. 
 98. Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *3 (citations to the trial transcript 
omitted). 
 99. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *3. 
 103. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted). 
 104. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted). 
 105. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted). 
 106. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868. 
 107. Id. 
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Once outside, Holliday noticed that Super was there and the 
two began to argue.108  As the argument escalated, “Holliday 
extended his arm, apparently in an effort to push Super off the 
stairs leading from the yard to the deck.”109  In response, Super 
pulled a gun out and shot Holliday.110  Super fled, but Back stayed 
to perform CPR until the police arrived.111  In addition, “after the 
police were called but before they arrived, the phone rang at 
Holliday’s house and, when Brandon Senescall answered it, Nick 
Super said ‘That’s what you get when you [expletive deleted] with 
me, bitch.’”112  Despite Back’s efforts, Holliday died at the scene.113 
In the police interview following the shooting, Back stated that 
she did not know that Super had a gun that night,114 but she did 
mention that Super was known to keep a gun under the seat of his 
car.115  She also mentioned that Super was “known to pull his gun 
out on anybody.”116  
B. The Lower Courts’ Holdings 
Following Holliday’s death, Back was indicted by a grand jury 
for first-degree premeditated murder,117 first-degree domestic abuse 
murder,118 and second-degree intentional murder.119  At the 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *4 (citations to the trial transcript 
omitted). 
 113. Id.  Super was subsequently convicted of second-degree intentional 
murder.  See State v. Super, No. A09-242, 2010 WL 1541184, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 20, 2010). 
 114.   Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *8 (citations to the trial transcript 
omitted).  It is also important to note that “although [Back] stated to police that 
she did not know that Super had a gun, the jury was not obligated to believe her; 
the jury was able to view her demeanor in the videotaped statement to police and 
could—and in all likelihood did—determine that she was lying.”  Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *2 (citations to the trial 
transcript omitted). 
 116. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868.  But Back also noted that “Super had dropped 
her off at Holliday’s house before without incident and had no reason to believe 
that he would not do the same on the night of the shooting.”  Id.  Again, however, 
it is the jury’s job to determine the credibility of the witness and the evidence 
proffered.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 114. 
 117. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868; see MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2008). 
 118. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868; see MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(6)(c) (2008). 
 119. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subdiv. 1(1) (2008).  See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868.  
During the trial, the court granted Back’s motion for acquittal on the first-degree 
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sentencing, the trial judge stated 
I think this was a situation where, in truth, Ms. Back, you 
enjoyed and got some satisfaction out of having the young 
men involved here respond to you and react to you . . . it 
was foreseeable, I believe, to you that this could have 
happened.  I don’t believe you set out intending that 
Danny be shot, but you acted in disregard of the obvious 
risk that that could happen, and that’s why you are here 
today being convicted—having been convicted by the 
jury.120 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.121  
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Back 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Back’s petition for 
review and unanimously reversed the court of appeals’ decision.122  
Instead of focusing on whether there was evidentiary support for 
culpable negligence beyond a reasonable doubt, the supreme court 
focused on whether Back owed Holliday a duty.123  Using the duty 
determination as a threshold question for the finding of culpable 
negligence, the supreme court reversed the decision, because 
“[t]he State did not introduce any evidence to support the 
conclusion that Back had a relationship with Holliday suggesting 
she would protect Holliday or that Holliday assumed she would 
protect him”124 and “there was no evidence to support the 
conclusion that Back had an obligation to direct or control Super 
in any way.”125 
 
domestic abuse charge and the second-degree intentional murder charge.  Id. at 
868–69.  The court also granted the State’s motion to amend its complaint to 
include the offense of second-degree manslaughter under Minnesota Statute 
section 609.205(1) (2008).  Id. at 869.  The State also moved to dismiss the first-
degree premeditated murder charge.  Id.  Upon completion of the trial, the jury 
found Back guilty of second-degree manslaughter based on culpable negligence.  
Id.  Thereafter, Back’s motion for a new trial was denied.  Id. at 867. 
 120. Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *4–5 (emphasis added)(citations to 
the trial transcript omitted). 
 121. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 869 n.5 (“While Back did not specifically argue in her briefs that she 
did not owe a duty to Holliday, lack of a duty is implicit in Back’s argument that 
she did not breach a duty.”). 
 124. Id. at 872. 
 125. Id.  The court also stated that,  
[b]ecause the State seeks to hold Back criminally responsible for the 
criminal action of a third party, our cases require that the State prove 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BACK DECISION 
The supreme court’s analysis in Back is interesting because it 
seemingly fails to consider whether Back’s actions constituted 
misfeasance or nonfeasance.  This omission may have had an 
important impact on the outcome. 
A. The Back Decision in View of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance 
Distinction  
The supreme court first sets out to determine whether a duty is 
owed and uses the common law civil standard as its guide.126  
Instead of focusing on characterizing Back’s actions, the supreme 
court instead seems to focus on the acts of Super.127  In so doing, 
the court illustrates some of the confusion that an application of 
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction may cause.128 
For example, under a common law standard, such as the one 
articulated by Cardozo, one would first determine whether an act 
“positively or actively [worked] an injury.”129  If so, then there exists 
a duty.  Conversely, if the act instead “merely [withheld] a 
benefit,”130 one would then determine whether there was a 
relationship that gave rise to a duty.131 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts is in accord with this 
approach when it articulates that the general operative principle is 
a duty to protect against unreasonable risk of harm originating 
 
that Back had a special relationship with either Super or with Holliday 
that gave rise to a duty to control Super or to a duty to protect Holliday 
against the actions of Super. 
Id. at 871.  The court also noted that “[t]he State’s focus on foreseeability does not 
resolve the threshold question of Back’s duty.”  Id.  In a similar situation, the 
supreme court explained that the “‘question is not simply whether a criminal 
event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against 
it.’”  Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. 1985) (quoting Goldberg v. 
Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962)). 
 126. See, e.g., Back, 775 N.W.2d at 869 (“A defendant cannot be negligent, 
culpably or otherwise, unless the defendant has a duty that he or she breached.”). 
 127. See infra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra Part II.  If the question of duty for a showing of culpable 
negligence is answered using the civil standard, then the criminal act is only 
relevant if the act is nonfeasance.  Focusing on the criminal act is at best misplaced 
until the act is characterized under the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. 
 129. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928) 
(citation omitted). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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from one’s own affirmative act.132  Only if the act is an act of 
omission is the duty determination more restrictive.133 
Because the supreme court is applying the more restrictive 
special relationship requirement, it seems fair to assume that the 
court characterizes Back’s behavior as nonfeasance.  However, Back 
asked Super for a ride to a party hosted by someone she knew 
Super had pointed a gun at and whose house he had previously 
shot at; had knowledge that Super stored his gun in his car and 
would pull his gun out on anyone with little provocation; and once 
there, instigated a confrontation with Holliday by slapping a guest 
and throwing at least one beer bottle down the stairs.134  In essence, 
by bringing Super to the party, she provided the gasoline, and by 
instigating a confrontation, she struck the match.  Yet, despite all of 
these elements under the control of Back that “positively or actively 
[worked] an injury”135 to Holliday, the supreme court held that 
there is no duty absent a special relationship.136  
The supreme court based its decision on precedent whereby 
the criminal act is allowed to occur because of nonfeasance on the 
part of the defendant.137  Where there is precedent of an affirmative 
act leading to a finding of culpable negligence,138 the court does 
 
 132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) (“In general, 
anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of 
a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them 
arising out of the act.”). 
 133. See id.  (“The duties of one who merely omits to act are more restricted, 
and in general are confined to situations where there is a special relation between 
the actor and the other which gives rise to the duty.”). 
 134. See supra Part III. 
 135. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928). 
 136. See supra Part III. 
 137. See State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Minn. 2009) (citing Pietila v. 
Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (reversing a 
wrongful death action based in-part on the nonfeasance of the landowner)); Clark 
v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 707–10 (Minn. 1996) (holding that the 
nonfeasance of a property manager did not ripen into a duty to protect children 
from sexual assault by another resident). 
 138. See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.8 (citing State v. Schaub, 231 Minn. 512, 
513–15, 44 N.W.2d 61, 62–63 (1950) (remanding the case after determining that 
there could be culpable negligence on the part of the defendant when he, trying 
to kill himself, flooded his apartment with natural gas, which ignited when the 
landlord turned off the light to his apartment, causing an explosion and the death 
of the landlord’s wife)); State v. Cantrell, 220 Minn. 13, 20–21, 18 N.W.2d 681, 
684–85 (1945) (justifying a conviction of culpable negligence where the defendant 
left a fumigation job knowing that the chemicals were dangerous, and, by a 
combination of his failure to secure the door or leave a guard on-site, a child was 
allowed to sneak into the building and died). 
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not apply it because those cases do not involve criminal actions.139  
In focusing on the criminal act and not the act of the defendant, 
the court has taken a seemingly misguided view regarding the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.   
For example, in Back, the court notes that “[State v. Schaub]140 
and [State v. Cantrell]141 are inapposite to the culpable negligence 
issue presented in this case because, unlike this case, they do not 
involve the criminal activity of a third person.”142  Yet, the culpable 
negligence/duty issue143 is not defined—and should not be 
framed—by the criminal activity of others.144  Under a 
determination using the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, 
Schaub or Cantrell are suitable because they deal with misfeasance of 
the defendant instead of nonfeasance and, in that way, are arguably 
more on point.145 
The court stated that “[t]his is the rule outside Minnesota as 
well.  In the few cases from other jurisdictions in which the 
defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for the 
criminal actions of a third party, the courts have found a special 
relationship exists as a predicate for a finding of criminal 
negligence.”146  It is true that a duty to prevent the harm arising 
from the criminal acts of another because of nonfeasance on the 






 139. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.8. 
 140. 231 Minn. 512, 44 N.W.2d 61 (1950). 
 141. 220 Minn. 13, 18 N.W.2d 681 (1945). 
 142. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.8.  
 143. See, e.g., id. at 869 (“A defendant cannot be negligent, culpably or 
otherwise, unless the defendant has a duty that he or she breached.”). 
 144. See supra Part II. 
 145. See supra Part II. 
 146. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 870 n.6 (citing Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 
1960) and State v. Zobel, 134 N.W.2d 101 (S.D. 1965)).  Both cases appear to be 
nonfeasance cases.  The court stated that the court in Palmer “[held that] evidence 
sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree manslaughter in a case in 
which the defendant mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to beat her child brutally 
and repeatedly, eventually resulting in the child’s death” and that the court in 
Zobel “[upheld a] conviction for second-degree manslaughter where the defendant 
father knew of his wife’s extensive abuse of their children but did nothing to stop 
her.”  Back, 775 N.W.2d at 870 n.6 (emphasis added).  
 147. See supra Part II. 
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Again, however, Back does not appear to be a case of 
nonfeasance on the part of the defendant.148  In particular, the 
court of appeals noted that, 
[t]o sustain a manslaughter conviction the defendant’s act 
must be the “proximate cause [of death] without the 
intervention of an efficient independent force in which 
defendant did not participate or which he could not have 
reasonably foreseen.” . . . The original negligence here 
was appellant asking Super to drive her to [Holliday]’s 
house.149  
Because the supreme court did not endeavor to make a 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, we are left to 
divine how the court characterized Back’s behavior.  Reasonable 
questions regarding Back’s actions may include: Was it misfeasance 
on the part of Back up to the point that Super pulled the gun and 
was thereafter nonfeasance to try and stop him?  And what would 
have been required to characterize Back’s actions as misfeasance?   
Because of this uncertainty, it would appear that the court is 
implying that the conduct—criminal or otherwise—of the third 
party is more dispositive than the act of the defendant when 
establishing the existence of a common law duty.  Other 
jurisdictions are not in accord with this position.150  Minnesota itself 
has upheld a jury’s finding of liability under a negligence theory 
when the defendant’s action created a risk of harm to the plaintiffs 
by the criminal act of another.151   
Delgado v. Lohmar152—which the court points to for the rule that 
“[u]nder common law principles, there is generally no duty to 
protect strangers from the criminal acts of a third party”153—was 
remanded because the court determined that there was a duty.154  
In Delgado, some hunters were “engaged in an extremely dangerous 
activity, hunting with high-powered guns.”155  The notion that 
 
 148. See generally State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 7, 2009) (indicating that the court of appeals did not treat the case as one of 
nonfeasance). 
 149. Id. at *4–5 (emphasis added)(quoting Schaub v. Schaub, 231 Minn., 517, 
517, 44 N.W.2d 61, 64) (1950)). 
 150. See, e.g., McIntyre, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 106–07.  
 151. See, e.g., supra notes 45–47.  
 152. 289 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Minn. 1979). 
 153. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Minn. 2009). 
 154. See Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 484 (“[D]ue care requires that each hunter be 
mindful of the danger created by their entry to the occupants of the property”). 
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
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extremely dangerous activities may impose a duty was also 
articulated in Back when the court stated that “[t]he theory 
underlying these deadly weapons cases is that individuals handling 
dangerous weapons have a duty of care not to handle them in such 
a way so to harm others, and if they do, they have breached their 
duty of care.”156 
However, such a statement does not take into consideration 
why someone handling a dangerous weapon has a duty of care.  
One rationale is handling a dangerous weapon is an affirmative act 
and not an act of omission.157  Another rationale is that the risk of 
injury is so foreseeable or that the harm so grave, that a duty is 
imposed as a matter of law.158  Thus, one could argue that the 
stringent application of the special relationship requirement allows 
the supreme court to completely ignore the magnitude of Back’s 
reckless actions when she affirmatively acted as the catalyst in 
creating a very combustible situation.159   
B.  The Back Decision and the Court’s View of the Special Relationship 
Requirement 
Assuming that Back’s acts were nonfeasance, by reversing the 
decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court seemingly takes a very 
narrow view of what constitutes a special relationship.  The court 
seems to ignore the fact that Back had a brief intimate relationship 
with Super.160  Similarly, the court apparently ignored the fact that 
Back had a long-term intimate relationship with Holliday161 and that 
 
 156. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.7. 
 157. This would be consistent with the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, 
supra Part II. 
 158. This would be consistent with the special circumstances doctrine, supra 
Part II. 
 159. See supra Part III. 
 160. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867.  This determination was a foundation of the 
court of appeal’s determination that the jury’s finding that Back was guilty of 
second-degree manslaughter:  
To support its case for second-degree manslaughter here, the state 
introduced evidence of: (1) the prior intimate relationship between appellant 
and Super; (2) appellant’s knowledge that Super previously fired a gun 
into the victim’s garage; (3) appellant’s knowledge of the past conflicts 
between Super and the victim; and (4) appellant’s knowledge that Super 
carried a gun. 
State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) 
(emphasis added).   
 161. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867. 
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Back considered Holliday the “‘love of [her] life.’”162 
Back at one time had been in a committed relationship with 
Holliday,163 and had designs to resume a relationship with him.164  
While one or more persons in a failed relationship may be skeptical 
of each other, it is not fair to say, as the supreme court has, that 
there is generally no expectation to protect the other from harm, 
much less no expectation to protect the other from harm that one 
has affirmatively brought to the other’s doorstep.165  While special 
relationships are not predicated on love and affection,166 common 
sense dictates that a reasonable person would try to protect the 
“love of [their] life”167 from harm.  
Had Super instead been a dangerous instrumentality, such as a 
weapon, or a dangerous animal, the outcome may have been 
different.  For example, most would agree that the foreseeable risk 
of harm resulting from bringing a time-bomb or a grizzly bear to 
the party would give rise to a duty to protect others from those risks 
associated with their arrival.168  Yet, Super’s actions are very similar 
to those of a dangerous instrumentality169 or even a dangerous 
animal.170  Furthermore, this is not a situation where Holliday was 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 872.   
 166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARMS § 41 (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 167. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867. 
 168. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.205 (2008).  In particular, in State v. Frost, 342 
N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1983), the court held that firing a gun was consistent with the 
creation of an unreasonable risk created as articulated by Minnesota Statute 
section 609.205(1).  Id. at 319–20.  Also, under Minnesota Statute section 
609.205(4), if Super arguendo had been an animal instead of a human, one could 
make a showing that Back knew the animal had “vicious propensities or to have 
caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past, [and allowed the animal] to 
run uncontrolled off the owner’s premises, or negligently [failed] to keep it 
properly confined.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.205(4) (2008). 
 169. See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868.  In similar fashion to a dangerous 
instrumentality, Super was known to have a very volatile disposition and would 
“‘pull his gun out on anybody.’” Id.  In fact, the court of appeals analogized Super 
to a dangerous instrumentality when it stated that “[j]ust as the appellant in Frost 
should have known that the dangerous weapon she possessed was capable of being 
discharged in a struggle, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant 
should have known that Super was capable of shooting [Holliday].”  State v. Back, 
No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009). 
 170. While it may not be palatable to consider a human an animal, we are part 
of the animal kingdom and just because we have self-determination and the 
capacity for rational thought does not mean that we are immune from 
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fortuitously or randomly injured by the criminal acts of any third 
person.171  Super and Holliday knew each other and had a very 
tumultuous relationship.172   The facts indicate that Back was aware 
of the tumult, and the trial court believed that she fed off of the 
drama she instigated.173   
For at least the reasons articulated above, one could make the 
argument that an expansion of the special relationship 
requirement is warranted.174  Such an expansion would not toll the 
death knell for judicial efficiency.  As some of the cases note, even 
where a duty does exist, there still may be causation issues that 
would mitigate the number of cases tried by the courts.175  While 
causation poses its own challenges, the trial court judge, jury, and 





succumbing to our baser—more animalistic—instincts.  See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 
868 (noting that Super shot Holliday even though Back was screaming “[s]top, 
Nicky, stop.  Stop, Nicky, stop.”).  
 171. See, e.g., Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. 1985) (decedent 
was assailed by unknown perpetrators while on the defendant’s premises).  See also 
Back, 775 N.W.2d at 870 (“[u]nder common law principles, there is generally no 
duty to protect strangers from the criminal actions of a third party.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 172. See supra Part III. 
 173. See supra Part III. 
 174. But see infra note 177 for reasons why an expansion may be against public 
policy. 
 175. See, e.g., Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 333 (“[E]ven if a duty to provide protection 
were recognized, the question of causation would remain unanswered.”).  
 176. See State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 7, 2009).  It should also be noted that the jury returned a verdict finding Back 
guilty and that the court of appeals did not determine that this verdict was 
unreasonable.  See Back, 2009 WL 910756, at *1.   
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court’s review is 
limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is 
sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.  The 
reviewing court must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and 
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”  And the reviewing court will 
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the 
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was 
guilty of the charged offense. 
Id. at *1 (citations omitted).  Had there been a causation issue, any of the trial 
judge’s actions, jury verdict, or court of appeals decision would have likely 
reflected that fact.  
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There are a number of arguments to be made that a finding of 
duty under these circumstances would contravene public policy—
such as judicial inefficiency because of the increased focus on the 
use of standards, instead of no-duty rules.177  However, arguments 
directed to judicial inefficiency exist regardless of whether the act is 
characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance, because judicial 
resources are necessarily consumed when determining whether an 
act should be characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance.178  In 
addition, some of these same policy concerns seem to fall away 
when the court is dealing with misfeasance.179 
In Greater Houston Transportation Co. v. Phillips,180 where the 
defendant’s employee shot and seriously injured another driver 
with whom the employee had gotten into an accident, Justice 
Doggett’s dissent touched on the difficulty that these no-duty 
decisions create in establishing precedent when he stated  
 
 
 177. See generally Adler, supra note 2, at 911–26 (enumerating arguments that 
are utilized in opposition to a move towards a general duty of reasonable care, 
including issues with causation, individual liberty, societal values, and the 
impracticability in practice of the general duty of reasonable care: “Opposition to 
proposals for expanding the duty to act affirmatively to aid or protect another is 
based upon both substantive and ‘process’concerns.  The primary substantive 
arguments are that: (1) because a failure to act does not ‘cause’ harm, no liability 
should attach without misfeasance; and (2) positive duties would both interfere 
with individual liberties and would negatively affect society by requiring altruistic 
behavior.  The more telling arguments, however, are those that suggest that the 
judicial system would be strained by an expansion of the duty to [aid or protect].  
Some of those arguments arise whenever a court chooses to rely upon standards 
rather than rules.  Other arguments specifically address difficulties anticipated if 
obligations to [aid or protect] were expanded.”  Id. at 911 (citations omitted)).  
The argument could also be made that a general standard is more 
comprehensible than a no-duty rule with a collection of duty exceptions and that 
any judicial inefficiency may be worth it to that end.  Id. at 920.  In particular,  
[p]eople can understand a rule that says, “generally, you are expected to 
conduct yourself reasonably” more easily than they can understand the 
common law rule with its various exceptions or, perhaps even a rule that 
requires one to rescue or protect, but only where to do so would be 
“easy.” 
Id. 
 178. In other words, because the misfeasance/nonfeasance determination is a 
threshold question, the court must always characterize the action of the defendant 
in order to determine whether a no-duty rule is appropriate (and must expend 
judicial resources in the determination).  See supra Part II. 
 179. See supra note 177.  The three primary substantive arguments seem to be 
specifically targeted to situations whereby we attempt to hold people accountable 
for their nonfeasance. 
 180. 801 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting). 
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[o]n another day we may learn how many more shootings 
are required before a jury can be permitted to evaluate 
the reasonableness of this [defendant]’s decision.  A 
dozen people killed or maimed?  Perhaps not; under its 
narrow holding, today’s opinion may itself be sufficient 
additional notice for a court to impose a duty on the 
[defendant] to avert injury to third persons.181  
Perhaps here, too, the opinion in Back will provide “sufficient 
additional notice for a court to impose a duty on the [defendant] 
to avert injury to third persons.”182  Because, “[w]hen [the] ghosts 
of the past stand in the path of justice[,] clanking their medieval 
chains[,] the proper course for the judge is to pass through them 
undeterred.”183  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Back,184 the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to offer a 
compelling reason explaining why Back’s actions should be 
considered nonfeasance.  If Back’s actions were considered 
misfeasance instead, then the court failed to explain why the 
special relationship requirement was required to find the existence 
of a duty.  In addition, the court seemed to ignore other policy 
considerations that may have warranted an extension of the special 
relationship requirement.   
For example, the court could have held, as the court of 
appeals seemed to imply,185 that the previous intimate relationships 
between Back and Holliday or Back and Super were sufficient to 
create a duty to protect Holliday from Super.186  In the alternative, 
the supreme court could have broadened an application of the 
special circumstances doctrine to hold that Back’s actions 
constituted a special circumstance that created a duty to protect 
Holliday against the foreseeable danger that she created, based in 
part on the knowledge she had at her disposal regarding the 
danger that Super represented.187 
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Regardless of the approach, the supreme court’s decision in 
Back illustrates the problems in duty determinations under the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance rubric.  A more sensible holding would 
be that “an actor is always under the duty to see that other persons 
are not immediately exposed to an unreasonable risk from [their] 
acts.”188  Such a concept is succinctly captured by section seven of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts.189  Back’s actions foreseeably, 
unreasonably, and immediately created a risk of harm for Holliday 
when she arrived with Super.  Once there, her behavior only served 
to magnify the risk of harm. 
If we endeavor to create jurisprudence that reflects an 
incorporation of a greater deference to a general duty of 
reasonable care,190 the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction in the 
duty analysis should be put to rest.  In its misapplication, the 
distinction allows courts to hold that “‘criminal acts of third 
parties . . . relieve the original negligent party from liability.’”191  But 
as a general proposition, “[t]his archaic doctrine has been rejected 
everywhere.”192 
Unfortunately, it seems this “archaic doctrine”193 has not been 
rejected in Minnesota. 
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